Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Willard Y. Morris v. Ted Russell and Manila Russell
: Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Richards and Bird; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Morris v. Russell, No. 7630 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1393

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

()
SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTPfl

ILED
s-

l
MA'f
1951
WILLARD Y. ~!ORRIS, Executor of----------------lerk. Supre~;-(;~~-;~~·u~~-the Estate of William Shields,
Respondent,

Case No. 7630

-vs.-

TED RUSSELL and MANILA RUSSELL, his wife,
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

RICHARDS AND BIRD,
Attorneys for Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
PAGE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS..........................................................................

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON .............................................. 13
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................
I. Since the pleadings and evidence of both pa:rties establish an express contract, it was error to submit the case
to the jury on the theory of quantum meruit........................
II. It was error for the court to vacate its judgment of
involuntary dismissal made following the close of the
plaintiff's case ..............................................................................
III. The court erred in permitting the jury to award damages for the period prior to February 23, 1946, under
Section 104-2-23 U.C.A. 1943 ......................................................
IV. The court erred in refusing to grant a new trial on the
evidence of insanity and presumed insanity..........................

14
14
18
22
28

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 32
CASES CITED

Baster, In re, 191 Iowa, 407 182 N.W. 217 ..............................................
Bates, Will, In re, 225 Wis. 564, 275 N.W. 450 ................................... .
Bishop v. Parker, 103 Urtah 145, 134 Pac. 2d 180 ................................
Brown v. Wrightsman, 175 Okla. 189, 51 Pac. 2d 761.. ......................
Chavennes v. Priestly, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N.W. 766, 9 L.R.A. 193 ........
DiGregorio v. Skinner, 351 Penn. 441, 41 Atl. 2d 649 ..........................
Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588, 60 Pac. 45 ................................................
Greif v. B.L.B. Motor Repair Co., 182 N.Y.S. 765 ................................
Gulvranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah 115, 222 Pac. 590 ............................
Harris v. Whi,tworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S. W. 2d 101............................
Hull v. Lullough, 190 Ind. 315, 10 N.E. 270 ............................................
Johnson v. Gustafson, 96 Kans. 630, 152 Pac. 621.. ..............................
Johnson v. Johnson, 124 Oregon 480, 264 Pac. 842 ..............................
Lindenhold v. Walker, 102 K'ans. 528, 171 Pac. 603 ..............................
Koonce's Estate, In re, 105 Pa. Super. 539, 161 Alt. 578 ....................
Maxfield v. Dertadi,an, 66 N.Y.S. 2d, 346 ................................................
McConnell v. Crocker, 217 S.C. 334, 60 S.E. 2d 673 ............................
McCormick Estate, In re, 8 N.Y.S. 2d, 179............................................
McFweeters v. Cecil, 177 Okla. 454, 60 Pac. 2d 801.. ..........................
McMillan v. Miller, 108 Wash. 390, 184 Pac. 352 ..................................
Millar v. Macey Company, 263 Mich. 484, 248 N.W. 879 ....................
Parish v. Rigell, 183 Ga. 218, 188 S.E. 15, 107 A.L.R. 1385................

30
22
16
31
20
27
16
24
27
31
29
29
31
27
27
27
27
23
27
15
31

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-( Continued)
PAGE
Poorman v. Carlton, 122 Kans. 762, 253 Pac. 424-----------------------·----------Porter's Estate, In re, 110 Pa. Super. 27, 167 Atl. 490 ........................
Redferns Estate, In re, 64 Mont. 49, 208 Pac. 1072-------------------------------Roberts v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 93 Wash. 274,
160 Pac. 965·------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 39 Utah 580, 109 Pac. 817 ........................
Ruttle v. Foss, 161 Mich. 132, 125 N.W. 790 .... ---------------------------------------Schurr v. Savagny, 85 Mich. 144, 48 N.W. 547----------------------·-·------------Schuyer v. Southern Pacifi,c Co., 37 Utah 581, 109 Pac. 458 ................
Scott v. Walker, 141 Texas 181, 170 S.W. 2d 718 ....... --------------------------Shaw v. Armstrong, 88 Mich. 311, 50 N.W. 248-----------------------------------Shuler v. Corl, 39 Gal. App. 195, 178 Pac. 535----------------------·-·------------Spencer v. Sowers, 118 Kans. 259, 234 Pac. 972 at 973, 39 A.L.R.
365 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------State ex rei: Yilek v. Johlick, 66 Kans. 301, 71 Pac. 572....................
Steuer's Estate, In re, 77 Gal. App. 184, 247 Pac. 211.. ......................
Swarthout v. Lucas, 101 Mich. 609, 612, 60 N.W. 306, 307................
Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 Pac.
2d, 633 ----------------------------------------------------·-----------------------------·------------·---Witthoft v. Commercial Development Co., 46 Idaho 313, 268 Pac.
31 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Young v. Hansen (Utah, May, 1950), 218 Pac. 2d 666.-----------------------

30
26
29
29
19
16
16
30
27
16
25
22
31
26
16
20
30
17

STATUTES CITED

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Ubah

Code Annotated, 1943, Section 104-a-23________________________________________
Code Annotated, 1943, 'Section 104-2-23---------------------------------------Code Annotated, 1943, Section 102-13-49 .... ---------------------------------Code Annotated, 1943, Section 104-3-6 ...... ----·---------·--------------------Code Annotated, 1943, Section 104-49-2 (1)-------------------------------Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41 (b) ____________________________________________

2
13
30
30
31
19

AUTHORITIES CITED

58 American Jurisprudence, pages 92-94-------------------------------------·---------28 American Jurisprudence, page 695.·---------------------------------------------------28 American Jurisprudence, pages 737-738, and 735 ............................
28 American Jurisprudence, Section 23, page 670 ........ -----------------------58 Am. Rep. 405 ....------------------·--------------------------------------------------------------------44 'C.J.S., 92·----------------·---------------------------------············-·-·----------------·----------------Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 350............................
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 1459........................

31
31
31
30
31
30
17
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WILLARD Y. :\IORRIS, Executor of
the Estate of \Villiam Shields,
Respondent,

Case No. 7630

-vs.TED RUSSELL and

~fANILA

RUS-

SELL, his wife,
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against the defendants (appellants) in the amount of $4,500.00 based
upon verdict of a jury (R. 16) in a case brought to
recover money for personal services rendered by William
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Shields, now deceased, to the appellants both on the
theory of an express contract and on the theory of
quantum meruit. William Shields, now deceased, will
be referred to as plaintiff, and the executor of his estate
as respondent. The pages of the record will be referred
to in parentheses with no other designation.

STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
The amended complaint of the plaintiff, William
Shields, (1 & 2) alleges that plaintiff performed services for the defendants at their special instance and request from June, 1943, to August, 1949, and that appellants agreed to pay the plaintiff $100.00 per month and
room and board, of which no part had been paid except
$180.00, leaving a balance owing of $7,220.00. As an
alternative cause of action plaintiff alleged the same
services of the reasonable value of $150.00 per month but
without the express contract and sought judgment in the
same sum.
The amended answer (3 & 4) denies generally the
allegations in the first cause of action and in answering
the alternative cause of action alleges the contract between appellants and the plaintiff in which the plaintiff
was to perform services and have his room and board
with no cash payment nor settlement of any kind or
nature; and that the plaintiff had been paid in full according to the contract. The amended answer also set
up t~e bar of Section 104-a-23 U.C.A. 1943, a statute
of limitations limiting suit to four years (R. 4). This
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"·ould bar reeoyery for ~erYirP~ prior to February 23,
1946.
The rase wa~ tried before a jury and at the close
of the plaintiff'~ ca~e the appellants n1oved for non-suit
or the disn1i~sal of the plaintiff's case for failure of proof
as to each count ~eparately, whieh nwtion as to the second count wa~ sustained and the alternative count on
quanhun nwruit was stril'ken (1:2G).
The appellants put on their case following which
the plaintiff moved for reinstate1nent of the second cause
of action, whereupon the Court vacated its ruling made
at the close of plaintiff's testimony, overruled the said
motion of the appellants and thereby reinstated the
second cause of action ( 255) .
William Shields, the plaintiff and respondent, testified that he was sixty years old (-1-7); that he became acquainted with the appellants in 1941 when he was looking for work ( 48) and went to work for them for board
and room and small wages ( 49) in exchange for which
he took care of the chickens, one cow and some pigs ( 49).
He also did some garden work and received from the
appellants a little money for clothes, rnedical expenses,
etc. (50). In the summer of 1943 the appellants acquired
a motor court and plaintiff entered into an agree1nent
with them to work for thern for big wages, which was
not made definite at that tirne but later was fixed at
"about $100.00 a month, board and room," which conversation took place after appellants had moved to their
motor court (51). Nothing was said as to when the
money would he paid ( 5:?). Plaintiff's duties included
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Inaking beds, scrubbing, mopping, painting, keeping the
place clean and collecting rents (52). He also dug a
sewer trench, took out the garbage, shoveled snow (53);
also did some work on the sewer line for a Mr. Weedon
for which he received $17.00, approximately (57). On
several occasions, the appellants left the motor court
in the care of plaintiff while they took a trip (60).
During none of the time did plaintiff receive $100.00
a month from appellants, but he did receive his board
and room, although at times he got his own meals (63).
For a time respondent worked for a rock wool concern
about one-half day each week until he earned $50.00 in
cash which he kept, (63) and at this time he quit and
rented a room in town, but at the request of appellants
came back after a day or two ( 64). The job at the rock
wool place was obtained for plaintiff by the appellants
( 65). During all of the time plaintiff worked for appellants, he received from them approximately $180.00 including the $50.00 from the rock wool company for which
he gave them credit (65 and 66). Plaintiff didn't need
the money and testified that he figured when appellants
got ready to sell or got through with him they would pay
him and in the meantime he lived on the little money
he received and tips he got for deliveries of ice to the
guests (67). Plaintiff didn't ask for the $100.00 a month
because he thought the appellants would pay him and he
knew they needed the money on their auto court. He
intended to get the money at the time he quit his employment (67).
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Plaintiff left the e1nploy of appellants at one other
time and got a job at the Labor Temple which required
payment of union dues of $20.00, and when he asked the
appellants for the Inoney they talked him out of taking
the job because the work was too hard (69-70) and another reason for not taking the job was that there was
no place to board out on the salt flats where the job was
(70). Plaintiff finally left the employ of appellants about
August, 1949 (7:2).
The conversation about receiving $100.00 a month
took place after ~Ir. Weedon had finished a sewage job
and Mr. Weedon took about three years on the sewage
job (89 and 90).
It was in the summer of 1947 that respondent quit
his job with appellants and took a room in town, planning to go to Denver (94). Respondent made no demand
on appellants for money for wages when he quit in 1947
(95).
On redirect exa1nination the plaintiff testified that
the figure of $100.00 and board and room was established
within a day or two after he first Inoved to the tourist
court with appellants (105). And plaintiff further testified that he did not quit the employ of the appellants
when he inquired about the job at the salt works (106)
but he did quit in 1947 when he had an argument with
the appellants over the $50.00 (107), and after quitting
that time he came back to work for appellants at the
same wages (107).
Ted Russell testified for appellants that he and 1\tfrs.
Russell owned the State Tourist Court at 3114 South
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State in Salt Lake County and have been acquainted with
William Shields since 1941 (147). Shields was sent to
them by the Salvation Army and said he had experience
in far1ning and was willing to work for them for room
and board; that Russell advised Shields that "as far as
wages are concerned you may as well not come up because I couldn't pay that" (149). Russell introduced
Shields to Mrs. Russell and they then told him that if
he would help them they would give him board and room
and incidentals, "like clothes and smoking money," which
Shields agreed to with appellants (149). This arrangeInent continued until July, 1943, when they moved to the
South State Tourist Court (150).
Just before moving to the tourist court appellants
had a conversation with plaintiff in which they told him
they were moving to the tourist court and if he wanted to
go along under the same conditions to be yard man and
to clean snow, take away the garbage, clean up around
the front, pick up papers and help Russell out occasionally when needed he could come along. Plaintiff said,
"Give me a day and I will think it over." And on the next
day Russell asked plaintiff for his decision and Shields
said, "I can't get no work anywhere now, I haven't got
anything else to do, and I haven't got no money to go,
so if it's agreeable with you and Mrs. Russell I will
carry on the way I am, if it is agreeable with you. If it
isn't, I will have to get out." (150-151). On July 15, 1943,
they moved to the tourist court and Shields continued to
work there and did not at any time demand any money
from appellants except an occasional quarter for to-

)~
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bacco (1:11). He didn't demand any wag<'~ lweau~P he
knew what the agreernent was and that he was entitled
to no wages (15:2).
At the tourist court plaintiff was neYer left in charge
of the n1otor court and wa~ never given the care of the
cabins such at' changing the linen, n1opping and sweeping and so on for which purposes other persons were
en1ployed ( 153). Plaintiff was not a skilled workman and
could not be entrusted with Inany tools, as the breakage
he would cause wa~ nwre expensive than the value of the
work done ( 15-!).
'Vhen a ~I r. 'Yeedon took a contract on five cabins
the appellants released plaintiff to work for Weedon
and he earned $320.00 under the agreement with Weedon,
but 'Yeedon paid him only $47.00 (154-155).
When appellants were doing some other remodeling
Russell arranged to have plaintiff employed as a carpenter and introduced in evidence Exhibit 1 to show two
weeks work at $82.50 a week, which Shields received
(157).
Two or three times plaintiff con1plained about his
work and Russell told him he was free to go anytime he
wanted to and at one time offered to take hirn over to
Wendover to work in the salt n1ines. vVhen plaintiff
wanted to stay in the motor court and drive to and from
Wendover, Russell told him it was too far to drive to
and from work (157-158). Appellants also permitted
Shields to take side jobs such as feeding chickens for
1\like Dragos, a neighbor, and doing the work for the
rock wool man ( 159).
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In 1946 plaintiff quit once when Russell and his wife
had an argument about whether Mrs. Russell was supplying Shields with money. Plaintiff got sore and quit and
went away for three or four days but came back and
said he had spent the money he had on a drunk and
Russell said that if he wanted to come back under the
san1e arrangements as before he could, and he went
back to his cabin and continued until July or August,
1949 (161-162).
Plaintiff quit for about three days on the occasion
when he said he intended to go to Denver and that probably was in the fall or toward the end of the summer
in 1947 (164, 165).
Shields many times told appellant Russell that he
was a man of substantial property interests; that he had
a 240 acre farm in Oregon, owned a V3 interest in
Catalina Islands and that the city of Seymour, Indiana,
was paying him rental on the city, which city has a population of 130,000 people (168), and so far as appellant
knows Shields never received any money from any of
those sources (168-169).
Shields smoked a lot and Russell furnished him
money to buy tobacco, but Shields never made any demand for $100.00-a-month wages. On one occasion,
Shields asked Russell to take him back to Oregon and
said that if he could get to Oregon, he could make out
for himself (171-172).
During this time skilled work to repair and improve
the motor court was hired and paid for by appellants as
shown by the receipts and invoices and statements contained in Exhibit 2 (172-180).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellanb also supplied ~hields with either nwney
for clothing or with elothing and took care of him when
he was sick ( 181).
When the appellants and plaintiff 1noved into the
tourist court, it was understood that plaintiff was to have
his board and roon1 and tobacco 1noney and there was no
conversation about paying Shields $100.00, besides board
and room (183). It was in February of 1948 that Shields
was employed as a carpenter for two weeks at $82.50 per
week as shown on Exhibit 1 ( 188). The argument between appellants over the money which plaintiff had,
totaling a smn of $50.00, was not because Mrs. Russell
had paid wages to plaintiff but because Russell suspected
that his wife had given hin1 too much money from time
to time and that Shields had accumulated $50.00 or $60.00
(190).
Russell estimated that plaintiff received the equivalent of $145.00 to $165.00 per month, represented by the
value of board and room, tobacco, clothes and everything,
of which about $50.00 would be board and room, (191)
and at different times he aYeraged it up to equal approximately $120.00 per month (192). The Social Security
Taxes paid by Russell on Shields' e1nployment was at
the rate of $50.00 per month and Russell paid both his
tax and Shields' tax (192).
William Carlaw testified that he and Mrs. Carlaw
have lived at the State Tourist Court for eight years
and have known Mr. Shields while they have been there,
and that many times when the Russells went away they
left Mrs. Carlaw in charge of the motor court ( 205, 206).
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Shields claims to have been in charge of the motor court
at times, but he never was, so far as Carlaw knows,
as his wife was always left to take care of it (209).
Clarence Rodda testified that he has lived at the
State Tourist Court for six or seven years and has known
plaintiff there, and that in conversation with Mr. Shield~,
Shields has said he wasn't making any money there but
only his board and room, and he would like to get out and
get a job (219-220).
llfrs. Manila Russell testified that she became acquainted with !1r. Shields in 1941 when they got him
from the Salvation Army, and that he worked on the
farm for a while until they moved to the State Tourist
Court in 1943 ( 222-223). Shields took his meals with the
Russells and ate right at the table with their family.
Mrs. Russell made no arrangements with Shields about
wages, just told him that if he would like to come to the
tourist court with them it would be all right (224). The
arrangements for Shields' employment were made by
Mr. Russell through the Salvation Army and there was
no arrangement for $100.00 a month, and the only money
he received was when it was given to him by Mr. or Mrs.
Russell to buy clothes or to permit him to keep change
after going to the store, and he never asked for wages
at the rate of $100.00 per month (227). Shields also did
an ice business by buying ice a block away and delivering it to each of the tenants. His business was good
enough that the ice company brought a little wagon out
and put it in front of the tourist court for Shields' con-
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venience (~:2S). Rut plaintiff said it would be too nmch
work to fix it up so the iee eompany took it back (228).
The mon~y which ~[rs. Russell gave to Shields was
out of generosity and not because h~ had wages eoming
to him (233). It would probably anwunt to $10.00 per
1nonth between money and clothing provided for hirn
( 23-1).
~\ t

the elo~t? of the testirnony, the plaintiff moved
that the second cause of action which had theretofore
been stricken be reinstated, whereupon the Court vacated
its ruling and reinstated the second cause of action (255).
The Court instructed the jury that the case involved parts of the years 1943 and 1949 and all of the
years 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 (5 & 9) and instructed the jury that the case was submitted on alternative theories; one, an express contract and the other
an implied contract, and that under the express contract
there were two possibilities; one, that the contract was
for board and room and $100.00 per month, and the other,
that the contract was for board and room and incidentals
only (8 & 9).
Appellants excepted to instructions 1, 4, 5, and 8, and
particularly to references of the court in its instructions
to all of the years 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948. Also
to instruction No. 4 in referring to the possibility of
either an express or an implied contract, and to reference in the instructions to the reasonable value of services rendered (257).
The jury verdict was in favor of the plaintiff for
$4,500.00 (16).
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Appellants' motion for a new trial alleged error in
instructions to the jury, in excluding instructions prayed
for by appellants, also in permitting the quantum meruit count to go before the jury, and further on the
grounds of misconduct of the jury in determination of
the verdjd by chance. This motion for new trial was
based upon the grounds also that respondent was under
a legal guardianship when the suit was instituted and
was incompetent to sue and also that the respondent was
incompetent ( 17 & 18). This motion was denied November 17, 1950 ( 21). In the meantime Shields died and his
administrator was substituted as party plaintiff.
With reference to the first motion to strike, respondent filed counter affidavits showing that the jurors had
each placed a figure on a slip of paper. The figures had
been totaled and divided by the number of jurors and
that figure was used as the beginning point for the deliberations as to the amount of verdict to which respondent was entitled (S-2 to S-6).
Thereafter, and on December 11, 1950, a further motion for a new trial and for reconsideration of the error
in ruling was filed in which further facts were alleged
with reference to plaintiff's insanity and letters from
the superintendent of a mental hospital at Pendleton,
Oregon, were attached to the motion in which the opinion
is expressed that Shields, having escaped the hospital
on August 11, 1941, had the type of insanity recovery
from which was improbable. (22-26). This motion was
denied on December 15, 1950.
Respondent filed a motion to strike the second mo-
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tion of the

appellant~

for new trial alleging that the evi-

dence as to insanity was not newly discovered (32, 33) .
•\ppellant~ filed a statement of points on appeal in
the District Court (35-36).
STATE~IEXT

OF POIXTS RELIED ON
POIXT I

SINCE THE PLEADINGS AND THE EVIDENCE OF
BOTH PARTIES ESTABLISH AN EXPRESS CONTRACT,
IT WAS ERROR TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT.

POIXT II
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO VACATE ITS
JUDGMENT OF INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL MADE FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO
AWARD DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 23, 1946, UNDER SECTION 104-2-23 U. C. A. 1943.

POINT

I\~

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL ON THE EVIDENCE OF INSANITY AND PRESUMED INSANITY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE THE PLEADINGS AND THE EVIDENCE OF
BOTH PARTIES ESTABLISH AN EXPRESS CONTRACT,
IT WAS ERROR TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT.

The amended complaint in paragraph 2 and 3 of
the first cause of action definitely alleges an express
agreement to pay for plaintiff's services $10.00 per month
and room and board ( 1). The amended answer denies
these allegations and then proceeds to allege in paragraph 5 that there was a specific agreement for plaintiff's services as watchman and handy man "for which
the defendants agreed to furnish the plaintiff a cabin to
live in and his board during the period that the plaintiff
was so employed, it being expressly understood that
plaintiff was free to leave at any time and that he was
to receive no cash payment nor settlement of any kind or
nature; that the plaintiff agreed to the terms of such
arrangement * * *" (3-4).
The plaintiff testified that in the summer of 1943
he entered into an agreement with respondents to work
for them for wages of $100.00 a month and board and
room, which conversation took place after they had
moved to their motor court (51) although nothing was
said as to when the money would be paid (52).
The appellant Russell also testified that an agreement was made with the plaintiff shortly after they
moved to their motor court. He spoke to the plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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about it. The plaintiff a~ked for a day to think it over
and the next day advised appellants, "I can't get no work
anywhere now, I haven't got anything else to do, and I
haven't got no nwney to go, so if it is agreeable with you
and ~Irs. Russell I "'ill carry on the way I atn" (150-151).
He thereby continued the agreement he had had with the
appellants while they still lived on their farn1 which was
also an agree1nent for serviees in exchange for board and
roon1 and incidentals (149). The appellant ~Irs. :Manila
Russell confirn1ed this agreen1ent ( ~~-±).
It thus appears that both by the pleadings and
testiinony the parties established that there was an express agreement for plaintiff's services and the point of
difference and actually the issue of the evidence in this
law suit was whether the agreement was for board and
room and incidental n1oneys or for board and room and
$100.00 per month.
A comparable situation was involved in Millar v.
Macey Company, 263 :Mich. -!8-!-, 248, N.\V. 879, in which
the plaintiff sued for the value of services rendered in
the first cause of action on the cmnmon counts and in
the second cause of action under an express contract for
a commission on all sales at a specific percentage. The
defendant denied any indebtedness on the common counts
and in answer to the allegations of express contract denied that the contract was as pleaded between plaintiff
and alleged that if there was a contract, it was for commissions on the sale of certain lines of products only.
At the trial testimony on the cmmnon counts was at
first held inadmissable and later received on the theory
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that if plaintiff failed to establish his contract he might
still recover on common counts. The plaintiff recovered
a judgment and the defendant appealed. On the question
of whether evidence should have been received on both
theories the court held :
"The law in this state seems to be well settled
that where an express contract is entered into between parties, but they differ as to the terms
thereof, and there is evidence tending to support
the claim of each of them, it is for the jury to
determine what the terms of the contract were
and there can be no recovery on the quantum
meruit. In Swarthout v. Lucas, 101 Mich. 609,
612, 60 N.W. 306, 307, it was said: 'There was
no room for the jury to find an implied contract,
each claimed an express contract, and the sole
questionable fact was, which was the correct
one f"
The court reversed the judgment of the trial court
and ordered a new trial holding that the evidence in support of quantum meruit might have influenced the jury
and been reflected in the verdict. Other Michigan cases
to the same general effect are Schurr v. Savagny, 85
Mich. 144,48 N.W. 547; Shaw v. Armstrong, 88 Mich. 311,
50 N.W. 248; Ruttle v. Foss, 161 Mich. 132, 125 N.W. 790.
These cases were cited in Millar v. Macey.
Other cases holding that where an express contract
is sued on recovery on the theory of quantum meruit is
not obtainable are Greif v. B. L. B. Motor Repair Company, 182 N.Y.S. 765; Brown v. Wrightsman, 176 Okla.
189, 51 Pac. 2d 761.
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The san1e rule approached from n different point of
view is stated in TVilliston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 1-l-59 and Restatement of the Lau' of Contracts, ~ertion 350. The restatement ~a~T~:
"'The remedy of re~titution in money is not
available to one who has fully perforn1ed his part
of a contract, if the only part of the agreed exchange for such perforn1ance that has not been
rendered by the defendant is a sum of money constituting a liquidated debt."
This is the sarne rule stated by vVilliston at the place
indicated.
rnder the facts of the case at bar, Shields the plaintiff had performed his contract in full and there remained only for him to recover the money constituting
performance on the part of the appellants. This is not
a proper action on quantum meruit, but must be an action on the contract which was pleaded and proved and
admitted by the appellants but with a difference of opinion as to what the rate of pay was.
A recent Utah case is cited because it probably
should be distinguished from the case at bar. In Young
v. Hansen (Utah, May, 1950) 218 Pac. 2d 666, this court
allowed recovery on the theory of quantum meruit where
the plaintiff had sued to recover on a contract which
had been partially performed. The court observed that
the defendant would not be allowed to retain the property
which was to be operated by the parties under the agreement pleaded as well as the money whirh the plaintiff
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had paid to the defendant because this would result in
unjust enrichment to the defendant. For this reason
the court permitted a recovery on the theory of quantum
meruit although it had not been specially pleaded. This
is the very point made in Will is ton and the Restatement of Contracts at the places cited. Where full performance is given the only recovery is under the contract; but where an agreement has been partially performed, it is proper to bring a suit for the value of the
services rendered and it was this rule which this court
recognized in Young v. Hansen and recognized it even
though there had been no specific pleading of quantum
meruit.

POINT II
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO VACATE ITS
JUDGMENT OF INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL MADE FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the appellants
moved for a nonsuit or dismissal of the plaintiff's case
for the reasons that plaintiff had not sustained proof
of the elements that go to make up the cause of action
stated and the motion was made separately as to the two
counts and particularly as to the first count but directed
also to the second count. The court denied the motion as
to the first count and said :
"At the present state of the record, I am
inclined to grant the motion as it pertains to the
second count." Whereupon counsel asked, "The
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entire quantum meruit i~ ~triek<>n f' And the eourt
replied, .. Y e~ '' ( 1:2()), and then said, "'rhe nwtion
for a nonsuit, so far as it pertains to the second
count, is granted. You may lirnit your defense,
:\Ir. Burnham, to nmtters allef!;ed under the first
count. under an expre~s rontraet.'' (1:27).
And then, after the appellants had put on their defense under the court's ruling that the quanturn meruit
count was out of the case, counsel for the plaintiff moved
that the second cause of action be reinstated for the
reason that the grounds stated by the court were improper there being sufficient evidence of the value of
the services rendered by the plaintiff to enable the jury
to decide the case. Thereupon the court replied: "I am
going to vacate my ruling made at the close of the plaintiff's testimony for a nonsuit, upon the second count,
and now I will overrule the motion." ( 255).
This reversal of the court's ruling and reinstatement
of the second count was specially made a basis for motion
of new trial, the motion assigning also. error in giving
instructions on this point to the jury ( 17).
Under Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a dismissal of an action at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence is said to be an involuntary dismissal, and "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as
an adjudication upon the rnerits."
This court held in Robinson 1;. Salt Lake City, 39
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Utah 580, 109 Pac. 817 with reference to the granting
of a nonsuit:
"If a motion is granted, the only judgment
that is permissable is one dismissing the action;
that i~, one which arrests any further proceeding
in that action except on appeal. Such judgment
is not a bar to a future action on the same cause
of action, and cannot be pleaded as such."
The difference between that case and the present rule of
civil procedure is that a dismissal such as was made in
the case at bar at the close of plaintiff's evidence is a
dismissal on the merits and would, therefore, go beyond
the ruling of the court in the Robinson case.
And in Tintic Standard Mining Company v. Utah
County, 80 Utah 491, 15 Pac. 2d 633 the court granted
a nonsuit upon which findings of fact and conclusions of
law were made and a judgment was entered. On appeal
of this case this court said :
"We are at a loss to understand why the
court handled this case in this manner, because,
upon granting of a motion for nonsuit, the court
thereupon divested itself of the power to do more
than enter judgment of dismissal, or upon motion for new trial to grant a new trial or to deny
the motion."
A quite similar situation was before the court in
DiGregorio v. Skinner, 351 Penn. 441, 41 Atl. 2d 649,
where at the close of the plaintiff's case the court granted
a motion for nonsuit against one of the defendants and
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then after

th~

defendant had put on his case, it appear-

ing to the court that the ruling had been erroneous and
that there was some possibility that the defendant dismissed out of the ease should have been held, set aside
the nonsuit and granted a new trial as to both defendants. As to this 1natter the Supre1ne Court stated:
The trial court was convinced that justice required that defendants, .Jlrs. Daniels and Burg, be
given an eliual opportunity to show for whom
Skinner acted at the time of the accident. To do
this it was neces~;ary to grant a new trial to Burg
and take off a nonsuit entered as to l\lrs. Daniels."
44

It thus appears frmn these authorities that if the

trial judge believed he had committed error in granting
the involuntary dismissal of the second count the only
jurisdiction in the trial court was to grant or deny a motion for new trial. It is difficult to perceive how the court
could regard it as a fair ruling to reinstate the quantum
meruit count and submit that count to the jury after
ordering the appellants to try their case on the theory
that the quantu1n meruit count was out of the case. It
is hard to see how any situation could be more prejudicial to a litigant than this one. Regardless, therefore,
of the question of jurisdiction it is submitted that the
motion for new trial on this assigned error should have
been granted so that appellants could offer their proof
on the issue of quantum meruit before the jury shall have
that theory given to then1.
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO
AWARD DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 23, 1946, UNDER SECTION 104-2-23 U. C. A. 1943.

This section of the statute of limitations provides
that an action must be commenced within four years
upon "An action upon a contract, obligation or liability
not founded upon an instrument in writing * * * also, on
an open account for work, labor or services rendered,
or materials furnished * * *." The last portion of this
quotation has been included to anticipate the argument
of respondent that the matter sued on in this case was
an open account. This seems to be answered by Bishop
v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 Pac. 2d 180, where this
court was construing this same statute as applicable to a
claim for services by an attorney against a corporation
and rendered over a period of some nine and one-half
years. The court quoted from a decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court in Spencer v. Sowers, 118 Kan. 259, 234
Pac. 972 at 973, 39 A.L.R. 365, the following definition:
"A 1nutual, open, current account may be defined as an account usually and properly kept in
writing wherein are set down by express or implied agreement of the parties concerned a connected series of debit and credit entries of reciprocal charges and allowances, and where the
parties intend that the individual items of the
account shall not be considered independently,
but as a continuation of a related series, and that
the account shall be kept open and subject to a
shifting balance as additional related entries of
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debits or credit~ nre nmde thereto, until it shall
suit the convenience of either party to settle and
close the account, and where pursuant to the original, e~qn·p~~. or iluplied intention there is but
one single and indivisible liability arising frmn
such series of related and reciprocal debits and
credits, wh:ch liability is to be fixed on the one
part of the other as the balance shall indicate at
the tin1e of settleruent or following the last pertinent entry of the account."
It is quite· apparent that the particularity required of
an open account under this definition was not present
in the case at bar and that the plaintiff's cause of action must therefore succeed if at all as an action upon
a contract not founded upon an instrument in writing.
A number of cases have been analyzed in each of
which there was a suit brought or a claim rendered
against an estate for personal services rendered over a
long period of time and in which the application of a
statute of limitations was rnade. One such is McFweeters
v. Cecil, 177 Okla. 454, 60 Pac. 2d 801. That case was
an action against an administrator for services rendered
for thirteen years at the rate of $100.00 per year and for
an additional eight years at the rate of $250.00 per year.
The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff's right
was limited to recovery within three years next preceding
the death of the deceased. This was the principal question involved on the appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that cases on this general subject fell into
three categories: The first one applies the rule that
the law implies a promise to pay for such services when
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rendered and that a cause of action may be brought at
any time during the course of their rendition and no
recovery can be had therefore after the statutory period
has run following the rendition of any such services; the
second group was found to involve the situation where
there was no mention of the period of time for which
the services were to be rendered and no measurement
of the compensation to be paid and that in those cases
the employment would be regarded on a year to year
basis with wages payable at that time; the third group
of cases were found to involve employment where there
is a single hiring with a fixing of the service to be
rendered and the time when the compensation shall become due as at the death of the employer or at some
other fixed time in which case the services are to be considered continuous and the statute of limitations will
not con1mence to run until the services bargained for
have been completed. A Utah case classified in the third
group is Gulvranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah 115, 222
Pac. 590. This was an action for services rendered by
a daughter to her mother commencing in 1908 and running continuously until 1922 with temporary intermissions in 1915 and 1916. This court held that the mother
was inflicted with an incurable ailment and that the
daughter agreed to stay with her and take care of her
until she should die. For this reason it was held that
only one period of time was involved and that was from
the cmnmencement of services until the death of the
mother and that there were no periodic payments re-
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quired to be n1ade and that no suit could have been
brought by the dau~hter for any services until the death
of the nwther.
By contrast, in the case at bar, the contract was expressly shown to be one on a monthly basis with board
and room of $100.00 per month if the plaintiff is to be
believed (and, of course, if the appellants are believed
there was no n1oney at all owing to the plaintiff) and
there certainly was no testimony that the plaintiff was
to render services to the appellants until a certain specified time with an in1plication that there could be no :recovery of wages until that remote time had been reached.
In Shuler vs. Corl, 39 Cal. App. 195, 178 Pac. 535,
an action was brought to recover compensation for
services rendered to the defendant over a long period
of time. Prior to the employment the plaintiff had been
working at a drugstore and the defendant in writing
asked the plaintiff to render labor and services in general housework "for as long a period as the plaintiff
should choose to work for the defendant, whether a
month or years." The court found that there was no
specific agreement as to when the services should be
paid for but the plaintiff alleged that she was promised
that she would receive at least $30.00 a month in excess
of the amount she had been receiving at the drugstore.
The plaintiff worked for eleven years and then after
some delay brought the action and. the statute of limitations was pleaded. The court held that the facts established a contract to continue for as long as both parties
wanted it to and it could have been terminated at any
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time, and that under these facts it was the only reasonable construction "that the various sums of money which
would become due to the plaintiff would accrue at the
end of each month during the period of her employment" and held that the statute of limitations barred all
claims for months earlier than the statutory period.

In re Steuer's Estate, 77 Cal. App. 584, 247 Pac.
211, action was brought for board and room and care
furnished by the plaintiff to the deceased for 36 months
for $70.00 per month and the accounting was protested
by the heirs of the deceased under the claim that these
charges were payable at a monthly rate and that the
two year statute instead of the three year statute of
limitations applied. The Supreme Court held:
"Here the claim shows plainly on its face
that it was a monthly charge for services rendered
from November 27, 1920 to November 27, 1923.
Because of this fact, it follows as of course that
the portion of the claim covering services rendered beyond the two year limitation of the statute are barred, and was improperly allowed by
the administratrix and the probate judge."

In re Porter's Estate, 110 Pa. Super. 27, 167 Atl.
490, a claim was made against an estate for stenographic
and general office services performed for a period in
excess of six years. The court held that:
"Where services of a very general character
are rendered for a long continuous period of time
and the rate of compensation is uncertain, the
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statute of lilnitations bars a elaim representing
wages earned in the perfor1nance of such services
Inore than ~ix years before the filing of the account
of the debtor·~ estate."
The courts hold generally that where a contract
for personal sf•nriees is indefinite or uncertain as to
the rate of cmnpensation or the periods to be covered
by a specific an10unt of compensation the statute of
limitations is held to bar clain1 for compensation for
the services after the statutory period has run following
the rendition of any particular item or portion of such
services. In re Koonce's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 539,
161 Atl. 578; McConnell vs. Crocker, 217 S. C.334, 60
S.E. 2d 673; Maxfield cs. Dertadian, 66 N.Y.S. 2d, 346;
In re McCormick Estate, 8 N.Y.S. 2d, 179; Scott vs.
Walker, 141 Texas 181, 170 S.W. 2d 718; Etchas vs.
Orena, 127 Cal. 588, 60 Pac. 45.
And it follows a fortiori that where the agreement
calls for monthly or other periodic payments of compensation the statute commences to run at the expiration of any such month or other period and an action is
barred on a claim for compensation for such month or
other period after the statutory time has run fron1 the
close of the month or other period. Such cases are
McMillan vs. Miller, 108 Wash. 390, 184 Pac. 352; In re
Bate's Will, 225 Wis. 564, 275 N.W. 150; Harris v. Whitworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W. 2d 101.
Just why the answer of the appellants pleads the
statute of limitations as barring plaintiff's recovery
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prior to February 23, 1946 does not appear, since the
amended complaint was filed on February 14, 1950, but
no contention will be made that the statute bars anything
subsequent to February 14, 1946. The cases plainly hold
that where services are rendered on a monthly basis
the cause of action accrues at the end of each month
and is barred with the running of the statutory period
on each such item or monthly claim.
It cannot be argued successfully that no prejudice
resulted to the appellants through submitting the case
to the jury for the entire period of time back to the
middle of 1943 because the verdict of the jury was in
excess of the amount recoverable if the plaintiff had
been limited to going back to February 14, 1946. The
plaintiff quit work in August 1949 according to the
amended complaint (1) and the period of time from
February 1946 to August 1949 inclusive would be 43
months which at $100.00 per month would be $4300.00
or less than the jury's verdict of $4500.00 without giving
any credit for incidental moneys given to the plaintiff
by the appellants, admitted to be $180.00 (1).
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL ON THE EVIDENCE OF INSANITY AND PRESUMED INSANITY.

The first motion for new trial alleged discovery of
evidence that the plaintiff was under a legal guardian-
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ship in the State of Oregon and was an incompetent
person and an escapee from an Oregon mental hospital
(17-18). The affidavit supporting this motion gave no
specific infor1nation coneerning the insanity or confinement in Inental hospital (19).
But the second nwtion which was entitled •• ~lotion
for Xew Trial and for Relief frmn Order Denying Defendants Prior :Motion for New Trial'' was more specific.
It alleged incarceration in a state mental hospital in
Pendleton, Oregon, and that Shields was an escapee and
was incurably insane in the opinion of the medical doctor
who was the superintendent (22-23, 25, 26). For instance, the medical superintendent wrote in one letter,
":Jir. Shields was still insane when he escaped from the
hospital. In view of the long duration of his mental
illness and lack of improvement, I would not anticipate
that he would ever recover" (25).
)k

It, therefore, appears that these motions for new

TI

trial gave sufficient evidence for the court to assume
that the plaintiff had been insane and had been committed to a mental hospital in Oregon with no indication
that he would recover from his mental illness and regain his competence. And in addition, it is presumed by
the courts that established or adjudicated incompetency
and particularly insanity continues until an adjudication
of a change of status. Johnson 'l'S. Gustafson, 96 Kans.
630, 152 Pac. 621; Johnson vs. Johnson, 124 Oregon 480,
264 Pac. 842; In re Red ferns Estate, 64 Mont. 49, 208
Pac. 1072; Roberts vs. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph

,;
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Company, 93 Wash. 274, 160 Pac. 965; Witthoft vs.
Commercial Development Company, 46 Idaho 313, 268
Pac. 31.
Whether adjudication of insanity 1n Oregon shall
be accorded full faith and credit in Utah is a question
of some doubt as the decisions of the various states are
in conflict. See 28 American Juris prudence, Section 23 ;
"Insane Persons" page 670. The weight of authority is
said to, favor full faith and credit and is supported by
the following cases, among others: Poorman vs. Carlton,
122 Kans. 762, 253 Pac. 424; In re Easter, 191 Iowa,
407 182 N.W. 217. See also 44 C.J.S. "Insane Persons"
Section 32 d, page 92. The giving of full faith and credit
to adjudications of insanity by the sister states seems
to be required by Section 102-13-49 U.C.A. 1943 which
recognizes both non-resident guardians and non-resident
wards having property in this state.
Great importance mu~t be attached to the issue of
insanity. If Shields was insane he had no power or
capacity to commence this action, under Section 104-3-6
U.C.A. 1943 which provides:
"When an infant or an insane or incompetent
person is a party, he must appear either by his
general guardian, or by a guardian ad liten appointed in the particular case by the court, or
judge thereof, in which the action is pending."
The statute was held to apply to both resident and
non-resident persons in Schuyer vs. Southern Pacific
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Company. 37 Utah 5Sl, 109 Pae. -t-58. The cases hold

simply that an incompetent person cannot maintain a
suit in his own nan1e. PaTish vs. Ri.rJell, 183 Ga. 218,
lSS S.E. 15, 107 A.L.R. 1385; Lindrrlwld vs. WalkeT,
102 Kans. 5:28, 171 Pac. 603: Chavennes vs. Priestly,
80 Iowa 316, -!5 X. \V. 766, 9 L.R.A. 193; State e.r rel:
Yilek vs. Johlick, 66 !(an~. 301, 71 Pac. 572; 28 American Jurisprudence, pages 737-738 and 735.
Another ilnportant effect of insanity is that the
plaintiff was not cmnpetent to testify. Section 104-49-2
(1) U.C.A. 1943 specifically provides that among those
who cannot be witnesses are "those who are of unsound
mind at the ti1ne of their production or examination."
See Hull vs. Lullough, 190 Ind. 315, 10 N.E. 270, 58 Am.
Rep. 405 ; and 58 American Juris prudence, pages 92-94.
Furthermore, if Shields was insane his contracts,
including the contract sued upon in this case would have
been void. 28 American Juris prudence 695.
Because of all of these effects of the adjudication
of insanity a new trial should have been granted so that
the bearing of insanity on this entire case could have
been considered both as it involves institution of the
action, the capacity of the plaintiff to enter into a contract, and his competence to testify. It is apparent that
the course of a new trial would have been vastly different from the one which resulted in the verdict forming
the basis of this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The court cannot modify the judgment because it
cannot be determined whether the jury awarded a verdict on the theory of an express contract or quantum
meruit, and if appellants' appeal is sound in any particular a new trial must be granted.
The case should have gone to the jury to determine
the terms of the express contract between the parties
and recovery should have been limited to four years
prior to commencement of the action. Having dismissed
the second count at the close of plaintiff's case, the court
should not have reinstated it without giving appellants
opportunity to offer evidence thereon. And the presumptive insanity of the plaintiff requires that the trial
court now determine his sanity during the working period
and at the time of suit and determine therefrom whether
the plaintiff, now deceased, had capacity to contract, to
litigate or to testify.
Appellants submit that all four of the points urged
are sound and require reversal of the judgment of the
district court as originally entered and in denying the
motion for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS & BIRD
Attorneys for Appellant.
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